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Defendants-Appellants
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).

This appeal is taken from the

final order entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, the Honorable James s. Sawaya presiding, granting
plaintiff-respondent's motion for partial summary judgment on the
first cause of action of his amended complaint.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to find genuine

issues of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff-respondent
fully performed his contractual duties under the parties'
agreement?
2.

Did the trial err in failing to find genuine issues

of material fact existed as to whether the parties' agreement

completely and accurately reflected the intention of the parties
at the time they entered into the subject agreement?
3.

Did the trial court err in failing to find genuine

issues of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff-respondent
had waived his right to rely on the terms of the agreement as set
forth in the written contract between the parties?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
determinative.

Due to the length of this rule, the text is set

forth in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about July 7, 1981, plaintiff-respondent, Roland
Webb, and defendant-appellant William K. Reagan formed defendantappellant R.O.A., a Utah corporation.

(R. 689-90).

With the

formation of R.O.A., Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., a company
in which Webb was a majority stockholder, was merged into R.O.A.
Pursuant to the parties1 agreement, Reagan obtained 80% of the
stock in R.O.A. and Webb and his wife acquired the remaining 20%
of the stock in R.O.A.

(Id.)

In conjunction with the parties1 formation of R.O.A., the
parties agreed on an employment contract for Webb.

The employment

contract required Webb to devote his "best efforts, skill, and
experience in connection with his employment" to R.O.A.
695-97).

(R. 48-52,

See Addendum at pp. 3-7.
Notwithstanding the parties' agreement requiring Webb to

devote his best efforts in connection with his employment to

R.O.A., the record before the trial court contained substantial
evidence that Webb had breached his employment contract with
R.O.A.

In his deposition of September 6, 1988, Webb testified as

follows:
(By Mr. Fishier) How many hours a week
would you say you're putting in?
Mr. Anderson:

For whom?

Q. (By Mr. Fishier)
to the contract.
*

*

*

Mr. Fishier:
time?
*

*

For R.O.A., pursuant

Talking in percentages of

*

Mr. Fishier: To the first deposition, okay.
What I'm asking him is how many hours he
was putting in.
Q.

Are we talking 20 hours, 40 hours?

A.

Are you talking a week?

Q.

A week, yes.

A. For the first year I would guess at
least 35 to 40 hours.
*

*

*

Q. In 1983 how many hours a week did you
put in on the average?
A.

I would guess probably 35.

Q.

In 1984 on the average per week?

A. At least 30, possibly —
would be a realistic -Q.

In 1985?

I think 30

A.

Probably 25.

Q.

In '86?

A. About the same amount.
much.

I didn't change

(R. 1025 at pp. 35-37) .
Furthermore, Webb admitted in his deposition that he
spent considerable amounts of time working on his own advertising
projects while employed by R.O.A.

(R. 1022 at p. 18). Webb

estimated that during the period of 1983 to 1986, he spent only
about 80% of his time on behalf of R.O.A.

(R. 1025 at p. 48-53).

Others personally acquainted with Webb observed that he
was frequently out of the office, frequently handled only private
matters during company time, and frequently was not involved in
the day-to-day operations of R.O.A.

(R. 868-69).

In addition, the trial court had before it evidence that
Webb had failed to perform at least two tasks required of him by
the president of R.O.A., William K. Reagan.

(R. 881-84).

Webb's contracted employment to R.O.A. also included two
provisions dealing directly with his compensation:
4. Compensation. As compensation for
the services required to be performed by him
hereunder, the Employee shall receive a
basic salary of $100,000 per annum, payable
monthly.
5. Additional Compensation. The
Employee shall be entitled to receive
additional compensation annually equal to
one percent (1%) of annual net sales of
outdoor advertising of the company.
(R. 695).
There was considerable evidence before the trial court

that both R.O.A. and Webb intended and agreed that compensation
under the 1% gross sales provision, i.e., paragraph 5 of the
employment contract, would be due and payable only at such time as
R.O.A. had sufficient funds to make payments under the provision.
(R.

876-78, 881-84).

R.O.A.

In addition, evidence was produced that

and Webb intended and agreed that Webb?s "basic salary" of

$100,000 per annum was to be paid in $85,000 cash per year, plus
$15,000 in "trades."

(Id.; R. 51, 52). R.O.A. presented evidence

that pursuant to the parties' employment contract, from 1981 to
1986, Webb had received at least $332,608.54 in cash and $15,241.18
in reported trades.

(R. 878). Webb, on the other hand, contended

that he had received only $3 34,447.00 in cash and trades pursuant
to the contract.

(R. 702).

Prior to January 11, 1985, R.O.A. experienced severe
financial difficulties.

At that time, R.O.A. agreed through its

board of directors, of which Roland Webb was a member, to obtain a
loan from Massachusetts Mutual which included a restriction
limiting the total annual salary of Roland Webb to $105,000.
881-84).

(R.

During the term of Webb's employment to R.O.A. from

August 1, 1981 until August 1, 1986, R.O.A. never had sufficient
funds to pay Webb or William K. Reagan under the gross sales
provision of their respective employment contracts.

(id. 881-84).

On or about May 28, 1987, Webb filed the instant action
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, alleging
several causes of action against defendants-appellants, including
a claim that R.O.A. had breached their employment contract.

(R.

2-20, 33-78).

R.O.A. answered Webb's complaint, denying that it

had breached the employment contract, and asserting that R.O.A.'s
performance under the contract was excused due to Webb's
nonperformance.

(R. 202-72).

On or about August 4, 1988, Webb moved the trial court
for partial summary judgment against defendant-appellant R.O.A. on
count one of his amended complaint, claiming that he was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law for the sum of $342,747.00 for
R.O.A.fs breach of the employment contract.

(R. 810-12).

Oral

argument on the motion was heard before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, District Judge, on or about November 7, 1988. Judge
Sawaya issued a minute entry on or about November 9, 1988, finding
that Webb was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for R.O.A.'s
breach of the employment agreement.

(R. 937-38).

The order

granting Webb's motion for partial summary judgment in the amount
of $342,747.00, and certifying the same as final under Rule 54(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was entered on or about
January 5, 1989.

(R. 966-68).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court erred in failing to find that genuine
issues of material fact existed that precluded the entry of
partial summary judgment in favor of Webb on his first cause of
action.

The evidence before the trial court demonstrated the

existence of substantial issues as to whether Webb had fully
performed his duties and obligations under the employment
contract, whether the written contract fully and accurately

reflected the parties' intentions, and whether Webb waived his
right to rely on the contract, as written.

Due to the existence

of genuine issues of material fact, this court should reverse and
remand the actions of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO
WHETHER WEBB FULLY PERFORMED HIS CONTRACTUAL
DUTIES.
A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure must establish that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
P. 2d 624 (1960).

Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351

In addition, the contentions of the party

opposing the motion must be considered in a light most
advantageous to him and all doubts must be resolved in favor of
permitting the matter to be submitted to the trier of fact.
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmen, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d
807 (1966).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, it is

inappropriate for a trial court to consider the weight of disputed
evidence or the credibility of witnesses; the sole inquiry to be
determined is whether there is a material issue of fact to be
decided.

Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304

(Utah 1987).

On appeal, this Court's standard in reviewing the

trial court's ruling on Webb's motion for summary judgment is
identical to that standard used by the trial courts.

Lucky Seven

Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).

Plaintiff brought suit against R.O.A. claiming that he
had fully performed the provisions of his employment contract with
R.O.A.

R.O.A., in turn, answered his amended complaint by

asserting that its performance under the contract was excused, in
whole or in part, due to Webb's own breach of the employment
contract.

The determination of whether a contract has been

breached is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact to
determine from the facts and circumstances.

17 Am.Jur.2d

Contracts §355 (1964).
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Heywood v. Ogden
Motor Car Co., 7 Utah 417, 266 P.2d 1040 (1928), that the
determination of whether a breach of contract has occurred is
ordinarily a question of fact.

In Heywood, the plaintiff brought

suit for past due rents under a lease agreement, and for other
damages resulting from the defendant's alleged breach of the lease
agreement.

Defendant counterclaimed, alleging it was entitled to

a setoff under the contract due to the plaintiff's alleged breach
of the lease.

Defendant asserted that it had been deprived of the

use of the lease premises during a portion of the lease.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, presented evidence that the
defendant had accepted the keys to the premises on the day the
lease was to begin.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, the

trial court found that the defendant's acceptance of the keys
constituted constructive possession of the premises, and
instructed the jury that the defendant was not entitled to recover
anything by way of a setoff.

The trial court also instructed the

jury to enter a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the breach of
contract claim.
The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing and remanding the
matter for a new trial, found that the evidence of a mutual breach
of contract was in sufficient conflict so as to create genuine
issues of material fact thereby precluding a summary determination
of liability under the lease agreement.
The evidence before the trial court in the instant action
clearly established that genuine issues of material fact exist in
this case.

Questions of fact as to whether either or both the

parties breached the employment contract, whether any such
breaches were material, i.e., whether such breach excused either
party's performance under the contract, and what damages, if any,
were sustained by Webb as a result of any breach by R.O.A.
The Utah Supreme Court in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d
190, 364 P.2d 418 (1961), recognized that a party suing for breach
of contract must establish his own performance under the contract
as a condition precedent to the entry of judgment in his favor.
In Lowe, the plaintiff contractor brought suit to recover monies
allegedly due under a subcontract with the defendant.
was hired to do concrete work on a school project.

Plaintiff

After more

than 70% of the concrete work was done, defendant took the job
over from plaintiff.

Plaintiff then brought suit, alleging that

he was forced off the job and not allowed to complete it. The
defendant claimed that the plaintiff had abandoned the job due to
his precarious financial condition.

In discussing the plaintiff's

burden of proof at trial, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is an elementary principle of the law of
contracts that in order to recover upon a
contract, [a party] . , . must first
establish his own performance or a valid
excuse for his failure to perform.
Lowe, 364 P.2d at 421 (quoting Miller v. Young, 197 Okla, 503, 172
P.2d 994, 995 (1946).

Likewise, in Malot v. Hadley, 86 Or.App.

687, 740 P.2d 804, 805-06 (1987), the court stated:
[A] party to a contract who alleges that the
other party has breached must prove
performance of the party's own obligations
under the contract or demonstrate a valid
tender of performance that was rejected.
See also, Holland Development, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Consultant,
Inc., 81 Or.App. 57, 724 P.2d 844, 849 (1986).
Once R.O.A. produced evidence tending to show that Webb
breached his duties under the employment contract, it was highly
inappropriate for the trial court to grant summary judgment in
favor of Webb.

The determination of the materiality of Webb's

alleged breach must be submitted to the trier of fact.

See State

v. Scott, 59 Or.App. 25, 650 P.2d 158 (1982); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §§241 and 242 (1981).

Only after the materiality of

Webb's alleged breach has been determined by a trier of fact can
there be a determination of whether R.O.A.fs duties under the
employment contract were discharged, either in whole or in part.
The determination of the materiality of Webb's alleged
breach furthermore affects the resolution of the issue of damages
in the instant case.

The trial court had before it a genuine

issue of material fact as to the amount of compensation Webb
-10-

actually received under the employment contract.

(R. 702, 878).

Due to the existence of such a conflict, the trial court erred in
entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of Webb in the
amount of $342,747.00.
POINT II.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO
WHETHER THE WRITTEN CONTRACT FULLY OR
ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE INTENTION OF THE
PARTIES.
While as a general rule, the terms of a written contract
cannot be varied by parol evidence, "the parol evidence rule as a
principle of contract interpretation has a very narrow
application."
1985).

Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah-

The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Union Bank that the

parol evidence rule has no application to a non-integrated
contract, i.e., a written contract was not intended by the parties
to reflect the entire agreement.

R.O.A. demonstrated that the

R.O.A. and Webb did not intend the written contract of employment
to encompass or incorporate the entire agreement between them.
The written contract merely states that Webb's "basic salary" is
to be $100,000 per annum. There is no indication what portion of
that salary is to be paid in cash or trades. However, R.O.A.
produced evidence demonstrating that the parties clearly intended
that the salary would be divided between cash payments and items
received in trade from R.O.A.fs clients.

In addition, the trial

court had evidence before it that the written contract did not
incorporate the condition, clearly understood and agreed upon by
the parties, that R.O.A. must turn a profit and have sufficient

cash available to it before the 1% gross sales provision could be
paid to Webb.
The parol evidence rule likewise did not preclude R.O.A.
from introducting evidence of the negotiations leading up to the
eventual formation of the employment contract, especially where
such evidence shows that the executed written contract does not
state accurately the intention of the parties.

See, Brean v.

North Campbell Professional Building, 26 Ariz.App. 381, 548 P.2d
1193, 1196 (1976) .
In Union Bank, the Utah Supreme Court also noted that the
parol evidence rule does not bar parol evidence of the
circumstances under which a contract is negotiated and executed.
In Union Bank, defendants, Ronald and Marjorie Swenson, executed a
promissory note in favor of plaintiff bank.
the note "individually and personally."

The Swensons signed

Ronald Swenson also

signed the note in his capacity as president of State Lumber, Inc.
Upon default on the note, plaintiff brought suit against State
Lumber and the Swensons in their individual capacity.

The

Swensons contested their personal liability.
The Swensons submitted affidavits to that effect in
opposition to the plaintiff's motion.

The trial court, applying

the parol evidence rule, found no genuine issue of material fact
and granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, and the
Swensons appealed.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's ruling.

In so ruling, the Court held:

The parol evidence rule as a principle of
contract interpretation has a very narrow
application. Simply stated, the rule
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements,
or representations offered for the purpose
of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract. Therefore, a court
must first determine whether the writing
was intended by the parties to be an
integration. In resolving this preliminary
question of fact, parol evidence, indeed,
any relevant evidence is admissible.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the
circumstances under which the contract was
made or the purpose for which the writing
was executed. This is so even after the
writing is determined to be an integrated
contract. Admitting parol evidence in such
circumstances avoids the judicial enforcement
of a writing that appears to be a binding
integration but in fact is not.
What appears to be a complete and
binding integrated agreement may be
a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an
agreement without consideration, or
it may be voidable for fraud, duress,
mistake, or the like, or it may be
illegal. Such invalidating causes
need not and commonly do not appear
on the face of the writing.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §214,
Comment C (1981).
* * *

Protection against judicial enforcement of
writings that appear to be binding integrations but in fact are not lies in the provision that all relevant evidence is admissible
on the threshold issue of whether the writing
was adopted by the parties as an integration
of their agreement. This appears to be so
even if the writing clearly states it to be
a complete and final statement of the parties'
agreement.
Id. at 665.

In remanding the matter to the trial court, the Court

held that the Swensons' affidavits raised genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the parties assented to the written
contract as a final statement of their intended agreement or
whether the parties executed it for some other reason or purpose.
Id. at 666.
The Utah Supreme Court in Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen
Brothers Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1983), also held that the
issue of whether a contract is integrated and reflects the
parties' intent involves inherent questions of fact that must be
decided by the trier of fact.

In Colonial Leasing, the plaintiff

leasing company transferred possession of a piece of heavy
construction equipment to defendant pursuant to a document called
a "lease."

When defendant defaulted on the payments required by

that document, plaintiff sued for damages.
an integration

The "lease" contained

clause and expressly required return of the

equipment upon expiration of the lease term.

Plaintiff moved for

summary judgment.
Defendant's affidavits in opposition to summary judgment
stated that it was the trade, custom and usage in the business to
accord lessees an option to purchase leased equipment at the end
of the lease and that plaintiff had orally granted defendant an
option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease period.
Defendant contended that the agreement was a contract to purchase,
rather than a lease.

The trial court held that the parol evi-

dence regarding an option to buy the equipment was inadmissible,
and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Upon appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case, holding that the affidavits submitted by the
defendant created an issue of fact on "whether the purported lease
Id_. at 487, The Court also noted

was an integrated writing."

that parol evidence is admissible "where the character of the
written agreement itself is ambiguous even though its specific
terms are not ambiguous."

Ld.

The court found that under

circumstances such as those presented in the instant appeal, a
trial court should be reticent to grant summary judgment:
Only when contract terms are complete, clear,
and unambiguous can they be interpreted by a
judge on a motion for summary judgment. If
the evidence as to the terms of an agreement
is in conflict, the intent of the parties as
to the terms of the agreement is to be
determined by the jury. In sum, whether a
lease was intended as security for a sale
is a question to be determined on the facts
of each case, as is the issue of whether
the nature of the document raises questions
of fact that preclude summary judgment.
Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
The evidence produced by R.O.A. in opposition to the
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment established that
the written employment contract did not represent the entire
agreement between the parties, nor did the written contract
accurately reflect the parties' intentions.

Evidence of the

parties' prior agreements and negotiations are admissible because
the contract is not a fully integrated document.

Such evidence

likewise assists the trier of fact in understanding the meaning of
the terms used in the written contract.
of Contracts, §214(c) (1981).

See, Restatement (Second)

Such evidence was also relevant to
_ 1 C

show that the parties omitted pertinent portions of the terms of
the employment contract, including the omission of a condition
precedent to R.O.A.'s duty to pay the 1% gross sales compensation.
See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§216 and 217 (1981).

Due

to the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to the
integrated nature of Webb's employment contract and the parties'
intentions in entering into the agreement, this Court should
reverse and remand the trial court's entry of partial summary
judgment in favor of Webb.
POINT III.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO
WHETHER WEBB WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO RELY ON THE
TERMS OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT.
Parol evidence is also clearly admissible in the instant
case to show a subsequent waiver of an express contractual
provision.

Linear v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So.2d 966 (Fla.

Dist.Ct.App. 1982); Pipe Industry Fund Trust v. Consolidated Pipes
Trades Trust, 760 P.2d 711 (Mont. 1988); Glenmark Associates v.
Americare of West Virginia, Inc., 371 S.E.2d 353, 356 (W.v. 1988).
Such a waiver may be shown by agreement of the parties, parol
evidence, or the parties' course of conduct.

First Capitol

Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Corp., 47 Ill.App. 699, 365 N.E.2d 66,
72 (1977) (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
The Utah Supreme Court in Zeese v. Siegel, 5 34 P.2d 85
(Utah 1975), recognized that the parties' course of conduct
provides persuasive evidence of what the parties intended at the
time a written contract was executed*

In Zeese, the plaintiffs

brought an unlawful detainer action against the defendant to
recover possession of certain real property.

At the time,

defendant was selling trailers and recreational vehicles on the
premises.

Plaintiffs originally leased the property to a third

party for an initial term of 10 years with an option for an
additional 10 years.

Following a series of subleases, the

property was assigned to Max Siegel.

By terms of the lease, such

an assignment was permissible without the consent of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were promptly notified of the assignment to Mr. Siegel.
Siegel took possession of the property in May, 1969, and later
gave notice of the exercise of the option to renew the lease for
an additional 10 years.

Thereafter, plaintiffs visited the

property on numerous occasions and observed defendant's business
practices.

Defendant continued to pay monthly lease payments of

$200.00 through June, 197 3 to plaintiffs.

Until June, 197 3,

plaintiffs never gave defendant any notice that defendant was
holding the premises as a month-to-month tenant or that plaintiffs
considered defendant's use of the property to be in contravention
of the lease's use covenant.

In reliance on the validity of the

assignment, defendant purchased various structures on the
premises and made other improvements to the property.
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that the defendant was
a month-to-month tenant who had improperly refused to vacate the
premises or in the alternative, that if the defendant had a valid
leasehold interest, the interest was subject to forfeiture due to
the defendant's breach of the use covenant in the lease agreement.

-17-

The trial court found the defendant's use of the premises did not
violate the use covenant and that the assignment of the leasehold
interest to defendant was valid.

The court also found that the

plaintiffs had waived and were estopped from asserting any
defects either in the assignment or in the exercise of the option
to renew.

Plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the trial court had
erred in admitting parol evidence that supported a finding that
the lease agreement was valid.

In affirming the actions of the

trial court, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is unnecessary for this court to construe
[the use covenant] independently of the interpretation made by the parties to this action.
Plaintiffs had had actual notice from the day
defendant went into possession of the type of
use being made of the premises. Although
George Zeese was frequently upon the premises
he never expressed an opinion that defendant's
use was in violation of the covenant.
Under the doctrine of practical construction,
when a contract is ambiguous and the parties
place their own construction on their agreement
and so perform, the court may consider this as
persuasive evidence of what their true intention
was. The parties, by their action and performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning
and intent; the contract should be so enforced
by the courts.
Id. at 89-90.
The affidavits of Norman Clark and William K. Reagan
demonstrated that the parties understood and agreed that both the
$100,000 per annum salary and the 1% gross sales compensation
provisions were subject to unwritten conditions and terms.
876-78, 881-84).

(R.

Furthermore, the parties1 undisputed course of

conduct contradicts the construction of the employment contract
adopted by the trial court.

This is such a case where "the

parties, by their action and performance, have demonstrated what
was their meaning and intent; [and] the contract should be so
enforced by the courts." Id. at 90. At a minimum, genuine issues
of material fact exist as to whether Webb waived his right to rely
on the compensation provisions contained in the written contract.
Although the doctrine of estoppel is not expressly
mentioned or relied upon in the Utah Supreme Court's rulings in
Colonial Leasing Co., Union Bank, and Zeese, each of those cases
supports the proposition that a party may be estopped from
relying on the provisions of a written contract where certain
contemporaneous understandings and representations were made with
the intent of inducing another party to enter into a written
contract.

Under the doctrine of estoppel, a party to a contract

may by his acts or conduct be prevented from denying in court the
effect or results of those acts.
464 P.2d 598 (Utah 1970).

Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441,

Estoppel should be utilized by a court

in order to prevent an injustice to a party who has, without
fault, been deluded into a particular course of action by
another.

Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah

1976).
The evidence submitted by R.O.A. in opposition to Webb's
motion for partial summary judgment establishes that during the
negotiations leading up to the execution of the written employment
contract that the parties understood and agreed that Webb's salary

was to be paid in a combination of cash and trades, and that the
1% gross sales provision would not be paid to plaintiff unless
R.O.A. had sufficient funds to make such payments.

In reliance

upon that understanding, the parties executed the written
contract.

Evidence supporting the defense of estoppel should have

been submitted to the trier of fact for consideration.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendants-appellants
respectfully request that this Court reverse and remand this
action to the trial court for a resolution of the genuine issues
of material fact,
Dated this
is

M

|^
(<t

dav ofof I/IICA
i Ar^
day
UlMA^
Q
HTD f l M f V C .
STRONG^S.

, 1989

U A MM
HANNI

R.

FH

ten J. Trayner
Attorneys for Defendants
DOUGLAS T. HALL
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
R.O.A.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant was hand delivered, this

lj

- day

1989, to the following:
Val J. Christensen
victoria Brieant
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

R8/APPBbc

ADDENDUM
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(b)

For defending party. A party against
whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.

(c)

Motions and proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue
as to the amount of damage.
*

(e)

*

*

Form of affidavit; further testimony;
defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall
be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary
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judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavit or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, made and effective on August 1, 1981,
by and between R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah corporation,
(hereinafter the "Employer" or "Company"), and ROLAND VJEBB
(hereinafter the "Employee").
1.

Term.

The term of employment shall commence on the

1st day of August, 1981 and shall continue until August 1, 1986.
2.

Nature of Employment and Services.

Employee shall be

employed as Chairman of the Board and Vice President and agrees to
provide such other duties as may be assigned to him by the Board of
Directors.
3.

Time Devoted to Employment.

Employee agrees to use

his best efforts, skill and experience in connection with his
employment.
4.

s

Compensation.

As compensation for the services

required to be performed by him hereunder, the Employee shall
receive a basic salary of $100,000 per annum, payable monthly.
5.

Additional Compensation.

Employee shall be entitled

to receive additional compensation annually equal to one percent
(1%) of annual net sales of outdoor advertising of the Company.
6.

Termination.

The Employer may not terminate this

Agreement for any reason other than fraud or gross malfeasance.
7.

Death Benefits.

If the Employee should die during the

term of this Agreement, the Employer will pay the compensation the
Employee would have been entitled to receive over any remaining term
of the Agreement to the Employee's estate.
8.

Records Upon Termination.

Upon termination of this

Employment Agreement, at the end of its terra or otherwise. Employee
agrees to promptly turn over all books, records, information,
documents, customer lists, instructions and all other instruments
pertaining to the business of Employer to Employer.
9.

Non-Cornpe t i tion.
9.1

Employee acknowledges that continued employment

by the Company will build an intangible asset, of goodwill of
value to the Company.

In consideration of the employment of
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Employee by the Company and of the performance by the Company of
the other terms and conditions of this Agreement, Employee
agrees that, during the term of this Agreement and for a period
of five^(5) years following the date of termination of this
Agreement tor any reason whatsoever, he will not knowingly,
directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, jointly control,
lend money to, endorse the obligations of, or participate in or
be connected with as an officer, employee, stockholder, partner,
counselor, adviser, or otherwise, any business engaged to any
extent in the outdoor advertising business nor will Employee
solicit site leases or customers for such business:

(a) within

a fifty (50) mile radius of the present as well as any future
office site where he performs -or will perform services under
this contract, or (b) within a fifty (50) mile radius of any
outdoor advertising plant previously served by Employee in any
capacity for the Company.

Employee acknowledges that the remedy

at law for any breach of this provision will be inadequate, and
that the Company, or its assigns shall be entitled to injunctive
relief should Employee breach this provision.
The parties intend that this covenant shall be
construed as a series of separate covenants, one for each county
encompassed within the area described.

Except for geographic

coverage, each such separate covenant shall be deemed identical
in terras to the covenant contained in the preceding paragraph.
If, in any judicial proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce
any of the separate covenants on the ground of unreasonable
area, then this unenforceable covenant shall be deemed
eliminated from these provisions for the purpose of those
proceedings to the extent necessary to permit the remaining
separate covenants to be enforced.

If, in any judicial

proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce any of the separate
covenants on the ground of unreasonable time, then the time of
noncompetition shall be reduced to a reasonable time.

-2-
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Employee has carefully read the provisions of this
paragraph and agrees that the time period and geographical area
of restriction are fair and reasonable and are necessary for the
protection of the Company's interests.
9.2

Employee agrees that upon termination of this

Agreement for any reason whatsoever, Employee will not solicit
any of the customers or site lessors of the outdoor advertising
plant owned by the Company at the time of termination, nor will
Employee offer to hire, or in fact employ or enter into any
partnership, corporation or other business relationship,
directly or indirectly, any of the employees, managers, or
independent contractors of the Company for a period of five (5)
years after termination of this Agreement.

Employee

acknowledges that the intangible asset of the goodwill of the
Company and the outdoor advertising plant managed by Employee
will be damaged significantly should such customers be solicited
or employees hired by Employee, and, further, as an amount
arrived at in good faith by both parties on the date of this
Agreement and estimated to reasonably compensate the Company for
the monetary loss which the Company sustains, Employee agrees to
pay to the Company or its assigns Three Hundred Thousand and
no/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) in the event of a breach of this
covenant,
10.

Successors and Assigns.

This Agreement shall inure

to the benefit of and be binding upon Employer and its successors
and assigns, and upon Employee, and his heirs, beneficiaries,
legatees and his executor or administrator.
11

•

Jurisdiction.

This Agreement shall be governed by

the laws of Utah.
EMPLOYER:

R.O.A. GENERAL^-INC.

EMPLOYEE:
'Holantf'Kctib'
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July 7, 1981

Mr. William Reagan
c/o Reagan Outdoor Advertising
Salt Lake City# Utah
Dear Bill:
This letter will constitute an amendment to ray
employment agreement with R.O.A. General, Inc. when that
document is finalized, a copy of which is attached to this
letter.
If you find the terms of this letter to be a
satisfactory understanding of our modification of that
employment agreement, as eventually executed in its present
form, please sign the copy of this letter and return it to me
for ray files.
It is ray understanding that I am entitled to
receive, in addition to the compensation set forth in the
employment agreement, two motor vehicles comparable in price
and quality to the two vehicles which I am now provided,
namely, a 1980 Pontiac Bonneville, and a 1979 Jeep Wagoneer
Limited. In addition, in connection with the use of those
automobiles, the company will reimburse me for any
expenditures relating to automobile expense, including
maintenance and repair. In the event of my death, it is ray
understanding that ray estate could elect to continue the use
of one such vehicle, and could elect to receive $500.00 cash
each month in lieu of the other vehicle, and therefoire, only
maintenance and repairs would be required on the one retained
vehicle.
With respect to ray compensation while employed by
the company, it is my understanding that any trades which areused by me for my personal use as opposed to business use^A-*'
will be charged to me at the rate of 50% of the face value of
the trade, and will be reduction in the sums I am entitled to
under the terms of the employment agreement.
Of course, it is also ray expectation that the
company will reimburse for any expenditures relating to
conventions, business entertaining, liberal use of available
tickets, normal clubs and other trade items which axe made
available to the company.

0 ouoS*
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Mr, William Reagan
July 7, 1981
Page 2

I understand that I am to retain my present office
space, and that the compensation which we have agreed upon
for the five-year period is non-cancellable for any reason,
including death, and that it has been calculated based on ray
providing services in the first through fifth year of
approximately 50% of my time in the first year, and in each
of the second through fifth years, the following respective
percentages of my time: 25%, 123£%, 73£%, 5%.
With respect to the competition agreement in the
employment agreement, you are aware that I am a majority
stockholder in Palmer Outdoor Advertising, and of course
that ownership is not considered to be competitive with the
business of R.O.A. General, Inc., and that I am entitled to
engage in business activities o#/€£^t corporation outside
the State of Utah . < ^ ^ 4 ^ ^ £ ^
With respect to your employment contract, a copy of
which is also attached, we have also agreed that you will be
entitled to the same types of benefits that I am, except
that you will receive, three automobiles and convention
travel expenses for your wife, as well as miscellaneous club
and other entertaining expenses.
We have also agreed that effective August 1, 1983,
we would determine to what extent your fatherfs salary could
be justified at its present level of $24,000.00 a year, and
to the extent that he was not rendering services of that
value, then any sums which were not being earned would
constitute a reduction in your compensation arrangement
under your employment contract.
I look forward to a lengthy and profitable
association with you.
Yours >tfery truly,

ROLAND WEBB

>0^~
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